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 Abstract
 
 The residential real estate brokerage industry represents a troubling instance of false 
appearances.  Though the numbers of sales agents and brokerage firms, plus easy entry, would 
appear to offer the promise of vigorous competition, actual practices in the industry have caused 
reality to fall substantially short of the potential.  After recounting the history of the transition of the 
securities industry from fixed and non-competitive stock brokerage commissions to far more 
vigorous competition, I draw on that experience to describe what vigorous competition in the 
residential real estate brokerage industry would look like.  I also suggest public policy measures that 
would help bring about more vigorous competition. 
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 "... In other words, this rate structure [for securities trading commissions] does not allow 
customers to choose freely among those services they wish to pay for and those they do not.  Without 
separate pricing of the product and its associated services, or alternative mixes of product plus 
service with different prices, there is no direct market test of the value customers attach to the 
offered services... 
 ... It should be kept in mind that a monopolist never gives up its position easily and will, if 
allowed, try to control, if not blunt, any change that portends an increase in competition..." (Manne 
1975, pp. 317, 322). 
 
 I. Introduction
 The real estate brokerage industry presents a troubling instance of an industry that, on its 
surface looks adequately competitive.  Nationally, there are currently about two million active real 
estate agents and brokers, associated with about 100,000 firms.1  The relevant market is, of course, 
much more local -- metropolitan areas or even individual towns.  Still, that national number spreads 
fairly thickly across the U.S.,2 and entry is relatively easy. 
 Nevertheless, this author, along with many other observers of this industry, has strong 
suspicions that it has not been fully competitive.  The historical prominence of "the 6% (or, in some 
communities, 7%) commission" is one troubling indicator.  Another is research findings that there 
has been a strong tendency of actual real estate commissions to clump at exactly 6% or 7% 
(depending on the local area)3 and that commission rates have been largely insensitive to large 
                                                          
    1 The Association of Real Estate Law Licensing Officials' (ARELLO) data show about 2.1 million 
“active” brokers and salespersons and about 360,000 additional “inactive” brokers and salespersons 
in the U.S. as of (approximately) the third quarter of 2005 (ARELLO 2006, p. 5).  At year-end 2005 
the National Association of Realtors (NAR) listed the number of members of the NAR at 1.35 
million. (The term "Realtor" is a registered trademark of the NAR.)  ARELLO data for 2004 show 
98,000 “active” firms (ARELLO 2005, p. 5).  Weicher (2005), however, reproduces data from the 
Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics that would imply substantially lower employment 
numbers. 
    2 For example, the NAR reports that there are about 1,700 local associations of Realtors. 
    3 See Hsieh and Moretti (2003) and GAO (2005) for summaries of these findings. 
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variations in house prices.4  Yet another is the history of the industry in using the local multiple 
listing service (MLS) -- a valuable centralized source of residential real estate sales information -- as 
a vehicle for excluding "mavericks" who might bring greater price competition to the industry.5  Still 
another is the industry's recent lobbying efforts -- and successes -- at the state government level to 
achieve regulation that restricts competition. 
 Consequently, it seems likely that a more competitive outcome is possible -- if permitted by 
the states and by the industry itself.  This essay will discuss what that more competitive outcome 
would look like and will suggest public policy steps that would help achieve this more competitive 
outcome.  In so doing, I will draw heavily on the historical example of another "brokerage" industry 
where competition was inhibited: the stock brokerage industry prior to the early 1970s.  The 
experience of that industry prior to the development of fully competitive stock brokerage 
commissions in the mid 1970s -- and the experience of that industry and its pricing structure since 
the mid 1970s -- will prove instructive for the real estate brokerage industry. 
 To anticipate that discussion:  A more competitive outcome would surely mean that average 
fees would be lower than they are today and that "the 6% (or 7%) commission" would be unlikely to 
remain as the modal fee.  But also a more competitive outcome would allow for a greater range and 
variety of services, at varying prices:  The house sellers that want "full service" from their agents 
would continue to be able to receive such service, at a "full service" (but competitive) price; and 
sellers who want lesser levels of service – picking and choosing among an “a la carte” menu of 
possible individual services6 -- would be able to get those levels of service as well, at appropriate 
                                                          
    4 See Hsieh and Moretti (2003). 
    5 The U.S. Department of Justice has a long history of suing MLSs on such grounds, of which its 
suit in September 2005 against the NAR was the most recent example. 
    6 Nadel (2006) lists eight separate services that a seller’s agent can provide: (1) listing the 
home in the local MLS; (2) setting an appropriate asking price; (3) advertising beyond the MLS: 
newspapers, online, alternative MLSs; (4) staging a home: interior decorating, cleaning, repairs, 
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prices.  This latter phenomenon -- the opportunity for greater variety that better suits clients' 
preferences -- is a sometimes overlooked but nevertheless important benefit from a more competitive 
outcome.  The role of the buyer’s agent could well change also. 
 This paper will proceed as follow:  In Section II we will provide some background on the 
industry and the competition issues.  In Section III, the story of securities brokerage commissions 
will be summarized.  Section IV will draw on the securities brokerage experience to offer 
predictions as to the likely outcome of a more competitive framework for real estate brokerage.  And 
Section V offers a brief conclusion. 
 
 II. Some Background
 A residential real estate transaction -- buying or selling -- is probably the largest financial 
transaction that most individuals will experience in their lives.  Nowadays, the typical transaction 
involves a sales/purchase price that is well into six figures,7 and seven-figure transactions are 
becoming commonplace in many areas.  Most individuals engage in such transactions relatively 
infrequently. 
 In these circumstances, the large sums and the lack of familiarity mean that errors in 
transacting may occur and can be costly.  In turn, this means that sellers and buyers are likely to turn 
to specialists/experts to assist in the transactions -- to be their agents.  And, also in turn, political 
pressures build for governments to establish mechanisms that try to ensure that the agents can be 
trusted. 
                                                                                                                                                             
etc.; (5) arranging visits by potential buyers, including open houses; (6) securing bona fide offers 
and feedback; (7) assisting in negotiations; and (8) handling closing – everything after a buyer’s 
offer has been accepted. 
 
    7 The NAR reported that the median sales price for existing one-family homes in February 2006 
was $209,000. 
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 The remainder of this Section will expand on these themes. 
A. The structure of agency. 
 Though some home owners contemplating sale serve as their own agent (this is described in 
the trade as "for sale by owner", or FSBO),8 most choose to hire an "exclusive" agent for a specified 
period of time:  Only that agent can represent the seller in the transaction (and earn the fee that will 
be paid by the seller) during the specified time period.9  The agent may be a solo agent/broker, or 
she may be one of a number of agents that are employed by or are associated with a broker (who will 
retain a fraction of the agent's fee).10
 The agent advises the seller as to an appropriate asking price for the house and also advises 
on pre-sale strategies to make the house more presentable to potential buyers, etc.  She then "lists" 
the house as available for sale and treats the "listing" as her "property". 
 Potential buyers of houses also turn to real estate agents for assistance and guidance.  
Accordingly, in her ideal setting, the listing (sell-side) broker will also find a suitable buyer and thus 
earn the full commission on the sale.  Next best, from the perspective of the brokerage firm that 
employs her, is that another agent in the same firm will be the one to find the suitable buyer (so that 
the two agents split the fee, with the broker retaining some fraction of both agents' fees). 
                                                          
    8 Nadel (2006) estimates that FSBOs account for 15-20% of residential sales. 
 
    9 Agents worry, legitimately, about the possibilities of others' free-riding on their efforts.  For 
example, in the absence of a contract that specified exclusivity, the initial broker might undertake 
substantial efforts to sell the house -- and then when a likely buyer was on the verge of making an 
acceptable offer, the owner might side-step the agent and negotiate directly with the owner (or use a 
lower-priced intermediary who had not incurred all of the costs of the initial broker). 
    10 In the terminology of the real estate industry, an "agent" is someone who has an agent's license 
(from the state where she works), for which she need not have any prior experience in the industry.  
Agents usually work for "brokers", who have a more advanced license that requires some years of 
experience.  The discussion in this paper will largely ignore this distinction and will generally refer 
to the individuals in the residential real estate selling/buying business interchangeably as agents and 
brokers. 
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 However, since there are usually multiple real estate brokerage firms in any community, the 
real estate industry in most communities long ago realized that these multiple brokerages could 
mutually benefit by jointly placing their listings into a common pool -- a "multiple listing service" 
(MLS) -- that could be accessed by all brokerages.   In so doing, each agent widens the range of the 
buy-side customers to which her sell-side listings can be exposed.  At the same time, each agent 
gains access to the others' listings and thus might succeed in connecting one of her potential buyers 
with another brokerage's sales listing.  In essence, both buyers' and sellers' transactions costs are 
reduced, since a buyer can thereby visit only a single brokerage but still have access to all 
brokerages' listings, and a seller can thereby gain access to all potential buyers. 
 In the event that brokerage B finds the buyer for brokerage A's listing, the selling agent's fee 
is usually split 50-50 with the agent who found the buyer.11
B. The potential for collective market power. 
 On the surface, the structural characteristics of the industry would seem to make the 
collective exercise of market power unlikely.  In most communities of any size there are more than 
two or three brokerage firms, and entry is easy.  In such circumstances, collusion (explicit or 
implicit) is usually difficult to implement. 
 There are, however, two structural features that make the collective exercise of market power 
more feasible than would otherwise appear to be the case.  First, because the MLS has been a 
powerful mechanism for encouraging efficient information dissemination by house sellers and 
                                                          
    11 Note that this structure reduces fears of free-riding on the part of the broker who finds the 
buyer.  Since the seller is committed to whatever fee has been negotiated with the selling agent (who 
will split it with the agent who found the buyer), there is no gain to the buyer to try to negotiate 
directly with the seller or to use a different agent just to reduce costs -- unless the selling agent 
would be willing to split the fee directly with the buyer, or a different buyer's agent would be willing 
to rebate part of her fee to the buyer.  An alternative way of dealing with these latter possibilities 
would be for the buy-side broker to negotiate an exclusivity contract with her buyer that would 
roughly parallel that of the listing broker with her sell-side client. 
  
 
 6
                                                          
efficient searching by home buyers, if a brokerage firm were to be unable to contribute its sell-side 
listings to its local MLS and/or be unable to access the local MLS on behalf of its buy-side 
customers, it would be at a substantial disadvantage vis-a-vis its MLS-member rivals in attracting 
both sell-side and buy-side customers.  Thus, the ability of the collective members of a MLS to 
exclude rivals -- especially if those rivals are "mavericks" who are price-cutters with respect to 
commissions -- can be a powerful way of enforcing a high-fee structure and thus of maintaining the 
collective exercise of market power. 
 Second, most real estate agents operate on both the sell-side and on the buy-side -- i.e., they 
try both to find listings and to find buyers.  Thus, unlike competitors in most markets, they are 
frequently interacting in vertically related ways that require cooperation in order for completed 
transactions to occur.  Today broker A may represent a seller and broker B may represent a buyer; 
tomorrow the reverse may be true.   This sell-side/buy-side reversible interaction provides a concrete 
means whereby agents who are the upholders of high fees can threaten to or actually discipline 
price-cutting rivals, even in the absence of a MLS.  A high-fee-upholding agent who has a potential 
buyer may threaten to or actually boycott the listings of a price-cutting seller's agent.12  Similarly, a 
high-fee-upholding agent with a listing may make it difficult for a fee-cutting agent to bring buyers 
to see the property.13  Much of this "steering" can happen without any formal agreement among the 
agents to maintain high fee levels, especially in a social climate where the importance of maintaining 
    12 Since the standard 50/50 split of fees between the sell-side and buy-side agents reinforces the 
incentives of a buy-side agent to steer a client first toward the listings of a full-fee agent, it may be 
difficult in practice to distinguish between such "natural" avoidance of the listings of a fee-cutting 
agent and a more sinister boycott that is intended to discipline the fee-cutter. 
    13 That such "steering" on either the buy-side or the sell-side is not in the interests of the high-fee-
upholding agent's customers, and thus is contrary to the agent's fiduciary obligation to her customer, 
is clear; but, in a milieu where there is a great deal of uncertainty as to which house will best fit the 
demands of a buyer and which buyers are true prospects for a seller, it may be difficult for the client 
to determine that her agent is steering in a disadvantageous way. 
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high fees is frequently discussed and remarked upon in informal settings.14
C. Fee rigidity as an indicator of inadequate competition
 In principle, the fee (or commission) for the agent's services is negotiable; in practice, 
historically, there has been a substantial tendency for the fee to be a fixed percentage of the selling 
price of the house -- usually 6% or 7%, depending on the community -- regardless of the magnitude 
of the sale price.15  Thus, if one house sold for twice the price of another house but the agents in 
both instances quoted and were paid the same percentage fee, the fee amount earned by the agent for 
selling the first house would be twice the fee amount earned by the second agent. 
 This last point is worth stressing.  If the agents' costs of selling the two houses were 
approximately the same (in terms of time, effort, advertising, etc.), then we would expect that 
competitive pressures would cause agents' fees to approximate those costs (including a competitive 
profit return on invested capital), thus leading to a tapering of the percentage fee with respect to 
higher-value houses.  Even if the costs of selling a more expensive house were greater than those of 
selling a less expensive house, it seems unlikely that the selling costs of the former would be 
proportionally greater (as is implied by the rigidity of the percentage fee). 
 Of course, in any line of business the quoted fees may well fall into patterns, and the use of 
round numbers, standard fractions, etc., would be expected.  Thus, it seems unlikely that any real 
estate agent would quote or be able to defend a fee of "6.078% of the sales price" to any prospective 
seller.16  But, still, depending on the likely selling price of a house and the agent's expectations as to 
                                                          
    14 There are at least two other troubling market situations that we note below where agents 
participate on both the buy-side and the sell-side, with frequent reversals of roles and concomitant 
opportunities for freezing out "mavericks": NASDAQ securities dealer transactions, and 
underwriting fees for initial public offerings. 
    15 The evidence supporting this claim is summarized in Hsieh and Moretti (2003) and GAO 
(2005).  As Nadel (2006) points out, this fixed percentage also causes potential differences in the 
quality of the services that different listing brokers might offer to sellers to go unrewarded. 
    16 Or, as Schelling (1960, p. 67) observed, the automobile salesperson who declares that the 
  
 
 8
the costs of selling, percentage fees that employed standard fractions -- say, 5-3/4% for a low-value 
and difficult to sell house and 4-1/4% for a higher-value and easy to sell house -- could well be 
expected in a competitive environment, rather than the extreme pattern of just 6%.  Further, to the 
extent that there are fixed costs that are associated with the agent's efforts (say, the initial 
consultation with the sellers) and also costs that vary with the expected selling price (say, more 
advertising for a more expensive house), a two-part fee -- e.g., $2,000 plus 3% of the selling price -- 
would be expected in a competitive environment.  The total amount of this two-part fee, when 
expressed as a percentage of the selling price, would exhibit the expected taper. 
 Further, as was noted above, a fixed percentage fee announced by most or all brokers in a 
metropolitan area prevents the inherent quality differences that surely exist among brokers from 
being rewarded.  It has frequently been noted that sellers that are attempting to coordinate their 
pricing behavior at above-competitive levels will usually favor simple pricing schedules over more 
complex ones, even if this simplicity means that quality differences go unrewarded.17
 There are two other indicators that, in conjunction with fee rigidity, suggest something less 
than vigorous price (fee) competition among real estate agents.  First, at times of surges in housing 
prices -- but constant fee percentages, which would imply rising profits -- there have been surges of 
entry into the ranks of real estate agents.  For example, as of year-end 2000 the NAR reported 
membership of 766,560 Realtors; five years later (and concomitant with a widely publicized surge in 
house sale prices), at the end of 2005, the NAR reported that its membership had jumped by over 
65% to 1,265,367.18
                                                                                                                                                             
lowest possible price for a car is $2,507.63 is almost pleading to be relieved of $7.63. 
 
    17 See, for example, Stigler (1964, 1968). 
 
    18 Hsieh and Moretti (2003) provide an estimate of the substantial costs of excessive entry and 
excess capacity yielded by the combination of fixed fees and free entry.  It is also worth noting that 
the estimate mentioned in the Introduction of about two million individuals that are active as real 
estate brokers or salespersons represents well over one percent of the U.S. labor force. 
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 Second, there have recently been a number of sell-your-house-yourself books,19 
emphasizing the large sums that can be saved through a FSBO that avoids or greatly reduces the use 
of a broker.  If real estate commissions were at competitive levels, the temptations for do-it-yourself 
FSBOs would be muted.20
D. Government regulation. 
 As was discussed above, the relatively large size and infrequency of residential real estate 
transactions would be expected to attract political concern and consequent governmental efforts to 
protect the households involved in such transactions.  Not surprisingly, then, all 50 states (and the 
District of Columbia) have governmental agencies that have responsibilities for licensing real estate 
agents and brokers, as well as involvement in other aspects of residential real estate transactions.21  
These state agencies often have the title "Real Estate Commission" or "Department of Real Estate".  
The first such agency was authorized by the state of Arizona, in 1912.  Also not surprisingly, there is 
a national association of these agencies -- the Association of Real Estate License Law Officials 
(ARELLO) -- that compiles records and statistics and holds annual conventions.22
 The primary goal of these agencies is consumer protection.  However, there are often 
conflicting views of what constitutes appropriate consumer protection -- and in some instances the 
agencies have adopted regulatory requirements (all in the name of consumer protection) that clearly 
                                                          
    19 See, for example, Carey et al. (2004); Nadel (2006) provides an extensive list of such books. 
 
    20 And, to anticipate the securities brokerage commission history that is recounted below, 
there were extensive try-to-avoid-the-broker strategies that were prevalent during the fixed-
commission period of the 1960s.  These efforts disappeared after brokerage commissions became 
competitive in 1975. 
 
    21 For example, many states also license mortgage brokers, establish escrow rules, license 
appraisers, etc.  See ARELLO (2006). 
    22 Forty-eight states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands are 
members; Minnesota and Wisconsin are not. 
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favor incumbent full-service real estate agents at the expense of agents who would provide more 
price competition.23  These requirements include prohibitions on buyers' agents rebating a part of 
their fee to the buyer (which has obvious direct implications as to limitations on price competition 
and indirect implications as well, since rebates by buyers' agents might put fee-reduction pressures 
on sellers' agents) and mandatory minimum service requirements for sellers' agents, thereby 
eliminating competition from discount brokers whose primary service would be to provide access to 
a MLS.24
 
 III. The Parallels with Another Brokerage Industry: Securities
 There is an interesting parallel between the fixed commissions that have pervaded the real 
estate brokerage industry and the fixed commissions that at one time (prior to December 1968) were 
the rule for buying and selling equity securities that were listed on the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE).  This section will briefly review the story of NYSE fixed commissions, the arguments that 
the NYSE advanced to defend its system of fixed commissions, and the consequences of the onset of 
"negotiated" (competitive) commissions.25
A. The NYSE's fixed commissions. 
 Prior to 1968, stock brokerage commissions for buying and selling NYSE stocks were 
uniform across all NYSE members.  They were set collectively by the NYSE members, with 
automatic approval by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).  The commission rate 
                                                          
    23 It is worth noting, however, that the state agencies have not generally adopted licensing 
requirements that are so stringent as to constitute a serious barrier to entry into becoming a real 
estate agent or broker. 
    24 The GAO (2005) report provides the examples and the states that have erected these anti-
competitive restraints, as of mid 2005; Nadel (2006) provides additional examples. 
    25 This narrative draws extensively on Baxter (1970), West and Tinic (1971), Friend and Blume 
(1973), Stoll (1979, 1981), Tinic and West (1980), Jarrell (1984), and Matthews (1994). 
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was set at a certain amount per "round lot" (i.e., 100 shares), with no discount for volume; thus, the 
commission for the sale or purchase of 1,000 shares was ten times that of the commission for the 
purchase or sale of 100 shares.  Further, the round-lot commission was higher for higher-priced 
stocks than for lower priced stocks.  During the 1960s, the commission to buy or sell 100 shares of a 
$20 stock was $27; for 100 shares of a $40 stock it was $39; for a $60 stock it was $45; and for an 
$80 stock it was $47.26
 Both features of this schedule contravened the likely costs involved in stock brokerage.  The 
costs of trading blocks of stock that were multiples of a round lot may have been somewhat higher 
than the costs of trading just a round lot, but they surely were not strictly proportional; and the costs 
of trading a $40 stock were likely to be only moderately different from those of trading a $20 stock 
or an $80 stock. 
 The decade of the 1960s was one of a major increase in the relative importance of 
"institutional" ownership of and trading in shares of stock.  Mutual funds, pension plans, insurance 
companies, and bank trust departments were increasingly important "players" in the securities 
markets and specifically in buying and selling shares of stock on the NYSE.  Their size meant that 
they were likely to be trading blocks of stock that were multiples of round lots.  The disparities 
between the NYSE's fixed commissions and the likely true costs of the stock brokerage activity 
being undertaken27 were all too apparent to these institutions.28
    26 See Stoll (1979). 
    27 See Stoll (1981, p. 20) for one such estimate. 
    28 One interesting difference between the consequences of fixed commissions for NYSE members 
and fixed commissions for real estate agents is that, unlike the relatively free and easy entry into real 
estate brokerage, the number of seats on the NYSE were fixed at 1,366.  Thus, rather than the 
potentially high profits from the fixed fees and rising volume of large-block trades being shared with 
entrants (as has been the case in real estate), the high profits instead were capitalized into rising 
prices of seats on the NYSE.  The price of a seat on the NYSE more than tripled between 1960 and 
1968.  See Stoll (1981, p. 23). 
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 Their response was predictable.  Faced with an unyielding NYSE,29 they tried to find 
alternative means of reducing their transactions costs.  These included: 
 - Obtaining in-kind services from brokers in exchange for bringing the institution's highly 
profitable trades to the brokers.  The services could include specialized securities research.  In 
addition, a mutual fund might obtain a commitment by the broker to sell the mutual fund's shares to 
the broker's clients. 
 - Directing the broker to "give-up" part of the commission to another NYSE member, from 
whom the institution had obtained services (typically, research).  Such give-ups were banned by the 
NYSE in 1968. 
 - Trading in "the third market"30 -- i.e., in dealer-mediated transactions away from the 
NYSE, where commissions would be lower.  But these markets were thin and not well suited to the 
large-block transactions that were the source of the institutions' unhappiness with the NYSE's fixed 
commission schedule in the first place. 
 - Trying to join (i.e., buy seats on) the NYSE so as to save on commissions.  The NYSE 
established rules that stymied such efforts. 
 - Trying to join regional exchanges (e.g., the Boston, Philadelphia-Baltimore-Washington, 
Chicago, or Pacific Exchanges), so as to be able to trade on those exchanges at more reasonable 
commissions.  Though some institutions did succeed in joining a regional exchange, the thinness of 
trading volumes on these exchanges again made them unsuitable for the large-block trading that was 
the source of the institutions' unhappiness with the NYSE's fixed commissions. 
    29 There is a parallel between the central role that the NYSE played as a place for sellers and 
buyers of securities to transact and the somewhat similar role that the MLS plays today as a 
central place for sellers and buyers of residential real estate to learn about each other. 
 
    30 The NYSE and the American Stock Exchange were considered to be the "first" and "second" 
markets, respectively. 
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 These institutions' pressures, plus that of the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of 
Justice (DOJ), led the SEC to hold hearings in 1968 and, in December 1968, to order the first break 
from the NYSE's fixed commissions:  Volume discounts were required.  Subsequently, the SEC 
mandated (in 1971) that the commissions on the portion of an order that was over $500,000 should 
be negotiated and (in 1972) that the commissions on the portion of an order that was over $300,000 
should be negotiated.  Finally, on May 1, 1975 (known for many years afterward as "May Day" in 
the securities industry), all brokerage commissions, regardless of size, became fully negotiable.31
B. The NYSE's arguments in favor of fixed commissions. 
 In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the NYSE resisted the idea of negotiated (competitive) 
commissions.  It offered an array of arguments: 
 (a) The brokerage industry was characterized as capital-intensive and therefore dominated by 
high fixed costs and low marginal costs; unrestrained ("destructive") competition would lead to 
prices (commissions) that equaled those low marginal costs, which would not allow the industry to 
recover its fixed costs, and thereby lead to industry dis-investment. 
 (b) Price (commissions) competition, and the dis-investment that followed, would lead to 
massive consolidation of the industry, with an eventual oligopolistic structure that would generate 
less competition and higher commissions. 
 (c) Competition would lead to fragmentation of the securities markets, with the consequence 
of poorer execution for buyers and sellers. 
 (d) Competition would mean the end of cross-subsidization, whereby the profits on the large 
institutional orders were being used to cover losses on the smaller orders of individual investors 
("the little guy"). 
                                                          
    31 The May 1, 1975, date for fully negotiable commissions was specified by SEC regulation.  To 
ensure that competition could not be undone by future regulatory changes by the SEC, the Congress 
mandated it in the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975. 
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 (e) Competition on price (commissions) would mean that customers would not be provided 
with the services that they needed, especially advice and research. 
 (f) The securities markets, and the firms that made those markets, had served the U.S. 
economy well; why take chances with an untried proposal? 
 The proponents of price competition had counter-arguments to each of these propositions.32  
Fundamentally, their argument was that the securities industry was not sufficiently different from 
most other industries in the U.S. economy; if competition was the norm (and served the U.S. 
economy well) in those industries, why should this not be true for the securities industry also? 
 In the end, it was the proponents of competition that carried the day. 
C. The consequences of competitive commissions. 
 Brokerage commissions began to fall on large orders in the early 1970s, commensurate with 
the SEC's loosening of the restrictions on large orders in 1971 and 1972.  With the full opening of 
competition on May 1, 1975, commissions fell further.  The greatest and fastest decreases (as would 
be expected) were for the larger block trades by institutions; despite the reductions that had already 
occurred before 1975, commission rates fell another 50% by 1980.  By the late 1980s rates had 
fallen a further 25% from early 1980s levels.33
                                                          
    32 Briefly: (a) The fixed costs of the industry were not as great as the NYSE claimed, so that the 
destructive competition envisioned by the NYSE was unlikely; (b) The securities industry was likely 
to remain profitable for efficient firms in the industry, so dis-investment was unlikely, and with 
hundreds of securities firms present in the industry (as of 1970, there were 577 firms that were 
members of the NYSE, with about 500 "doing a public business"), there was virtually no chance of a 
consolidation that could lead to an oligopolistic restriction on competition; (c) Fragmentation was 
already occurring, because of the NYSE's fixed commissions, as institutions sought other venues for 
trading; (d) If cross-subsidy was indeed occurring, its elimination through competition would 
probably be a desirable outcome; (e) If securities transactors needed and wanted advice or research, 
they should and would be willing to pay for it; and (f) Competition is the norm for industries in the 
U.S. economy and should apply as well to the securities industry. 
    33 See Jarrell (1984) and Matthews (1994, p. 132).  With the onset of competitive rates, the 
institutions’ efforts to avoid the NYSE’s brokers’ commissions (i.e., all of the efforts detailed above, 
such as trying to join the NYSE itself, seeking give-ups, etc.) quickly subsided. 
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 Commission rates for individuals experienced a more varied pattern.  Commissions on low-
volume trades actually increased (which supported the NYSE's claims that these transactions had 
been cross-subsidized).  But the commissions on higher volume trades for individuals declined, so 
that average commissions for individuals also fell (though not by as much as for institutions). 
 Equally important, with the end of fixed commissions, an alternative business model for 
brokerage arose for the first time: "discount brokers", who offered reduced services (primarily bare-
bones execution, without offering advice or research or well-appointed offices where customers 
could congregate and watch the ticker-tape) at reduced commissions.34  Firms, such as Schwab, 
Muriel Siebert, Brown & Co., Waterhouse, Quick & Reilly, and National Discount, offering various 
levels of services at various prices, came into prominence.  In addition, a number of mutual funds, 
such as Fidelity and Vanguard, established discount brokerage subsidiaries, as did some commercial 
banks that entered the brokerage field.  The presence of the discount broker model offered an 
important alternative choice for customers who did not want the "full service" of the traditional 
securities firm and wanted instead an unbundled or "a la carte" choice of services. 
 Much later in the 1990s, as electronic placement of orders via the Internet became a viable 
alternative to more traditional methods of placing orders, at much lower costs, this model too was 
embraced by a segment of the industry, many of them originally discount brokers and some of them 
new discount entrants (such as E*Trade and Ameritrade), with appropriately lower prices. 
 Finally, the industry did indeed experience substantial consolidation subsequent to 1975.35  
    34 It is important to emphasize that this discount broker model could not have arisen prior to the 
end of fixed commissions.  If otherwise competitive sellers are allowed to charge only a single 
(floor) price for their basic service (i.e., they are not permitted to compete on price), and this floor 
price exceeds their marginal costs of that service, then their competitive efforts will instead be 
channeled into providing greater services to their customers.  Since a low-service seller could not 
charge a commensurately low (discount) price, it would be at a competitive disadvantage in this 
mandated price-floor environment.  See, for example, White (1972). 
    35 As of 1974 the four-firm concentration ratio for all securities firms doing a public business 
(based on total capital) was 29.4%, and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) was 460; by 1991 
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But, as of 2006, there are still well over 200 securities firms that "do a public business"; seller 
concentration levels remain moderate; there are dozens of discount brokers, in a well-established 
category;36 and oligopolistic forbearance in the pricing of brokerage commission transactions with 
the public is not considered to be a problem in the securities industry.37
 In sum, virtually all of the fears raised by the NYSE in its struggle to maintain its system of 
fixed and non-competitive commissions (except its argument concerning cross-subsidization) turned 
out to have little validity.  The securities industry successfully made the transition to a competitive 
environment without serious dislocations. 
 
 IV. The Consequences of More Vigorous Competition for Residential Real Estate Brokerage
 In this section we will use the experience of the securities industry to explore the likely 
                                                                                                                                                             
these figures had risen to 55.6% and 830, respectively (Matthews 1994, p. 109).  As of 1974, there 
were 508 firms that were members of the NYSE, with 420 "doing a public business"; by 1991, these 
numbers had changed to 518 and 329, respectively; by 2004 they were down to 321 and 229, 
respectively.  A different series developed by the Securities Industry Association shows the share of 
the largest 10 firms (based on total capital) at about 50% in 1980, rising above 60% in the early 
1990s, and then falling to about 55% in 2000-2001. 
    36 The category of discount brokers, when measured by number of employees, exceeds 10% of the 
size of the category of "national full-line firms". 
    37 As we noted above, there are two troubling areas of the securities industry where there has been 
and/or may well be less than vigorous price competition:  First, in dealer transactions in NASDAQ 
securities, settlements of price-fixing cases involving over $1 billion were reached in the later 1990s. 
 But this was a problem of collusion among large numbers of dealers (who interacted on both sides 
of these dealer markets), rather than a problem of small-numbers oligopolistic coordination.  See, 
e.g., Christie and Schultz (1994, 1995).  Second, the fees charged by underwriters for initial public 
offerings (IPOs) -- i.e., for new stock offerings by companies that are "going public" for the first 
time -- have tended to clump at 7%.  In this latter area, two of the characteristics that make real 
estate brokerage troubling are also present for IPOs:  For many small-company executives, an IPO is 
a first-time (or, at best, infrequent) experience; and the underwriter firms frequently interact as 
primary underwriters and as secondary distributors (and frequently reverse roles), so that the 
possibility of freezing out "maverick" price-cutters (commission-cutters) is present.  For a general 
discussion of the persistence of high underwriting fees, see Chen and Ritter (2000). 
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consequences of more vigorous competition in the residential real estate brokerage industry.  We 
also suggest public policy actions that could help bring about that heightened competition. 
A. What Would More Vigorous Competition Look Like?
 The story of stock brokerage commissions, just recounted, provides a reasonably good 
model for predicting what true competition for the residential real estate brokerage industry would 
look like. 
 First, the general level of commissions would surely fall.  Because no one knows exactly 
what a competitive real estate brokerage industry would look like, it is difficult to predict by how 
much the general level of commissions would fall.  Further, the extent of the fall would surely be 
influenced by the pace of innovation and change in the technology of selling real estate -- which 
again is difficult to predict. (Those who advocated the end of fixed commissions on the NYSE were 
confident that competitive commissions would mean lower rates -- but it is unlikely that anyone 
circa 1975 could have predicted the sharp decrease in rates that accompanied the onset of electronic 
trading in the late 1990s.)  Nevertheless, the direction of change -- downward -- is clear. 
 Second, as occurred in stock brokerage, we would expect to see a greater variety of services 
available to sellers, and a variety of (competitive) prices.  Those sellers who wanted "full service" 
would be able to obtain it, from a full-service broker and at a full-service competitive price.  Those 
who wanted lesser levels of service would also find them and at lesser (competitive) prices. 
 Third, new arrangements with respect to buyers' agents might well arise.  The current 
standard arrangement -- that the buyer's agent's fee comes from half of the seller's agent's fee -- may 
well be an incidental artifact of the current fixed-fee brokerage structure.  If sell-side commissions 
become more competitive (or much reduced because of reduced services provided by sell-side 
agents), then buyers may have to compensate their agents directly (as, of course, occurs in securities 
transactions).  As we noted above, in order for buyers' agents to circumvent potential free-rider 
problems, they may have to negotiate exclusivity contracts with buyers.  It seems likely that a 
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competitive market in residential real estate brokerage would be able to find its way to an efficient 
structure for these fees on both the sell-side and the buy-side. 
 Fourth, as new technologies for selling and buying residential real estate become feasible, a 
more competitive industry would readily embrace them. 
 Fifth, with more competitive commissions that react flexibly to changes in house prices, the 
surges of people into (and out of) real estate brokerage38 should be considerably muted, as should 
the problem and costs of excess capacity noted above.39
 Sixth, as occurred in securities brokerage, we would expect to see consolidation in the 
residential real estate brokerage industry.  There would likely be further expansion by existing 
national brokerage firms, as well as the development of new ones.  Nevertheless, we would expect to 
see the persistence of some local brokerage firms, since local expertise is surely valuable but may 
well be difficult to maintain and value in a larger national organization.  And, so long as the barriers 
to entry remain relatively low, the levels of brokerage concentration in any local market should 
remain moderate and should present little structural antitrust concern (although the concerns about 
the use of the MLS as a vehicle for freezing out mavericks and about the sell-side/buy-side 
interactions and their implications for freezing out mavericks should remain). 
B. How Could We Get There?
                                                          
    38 We mentioned above the 65% surge of NAR membership between 2000 and 2005.  By contrast, 
between 1980 and 1982, NAR membership fell by 19%, from 761,391 to 617,521. 
    39 Nadel (2006) mentions travel agents as a service sector in which commissions have become 
more competitive, as airlines ceased paying them a fixed percentage commission and as more 
airline customers used airline (and related) Internet websites directly to book their travel.  It is 
possible that wider use of the Internet by house sellers and buyers, with the help of alternative 
central websites, such as “Craig’s List”, could similarly reduce the role of the MLS and of real 
estate agents’ services as related to listing on the MLS.  There is still likely to be a role for real 
estate agents as advisors to sellers (an “a la carte” list of disaggregated services was noted 
above) and as advisors to buyers, just as travel agents still provide advice to travelers. 
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 The more competitive residential real estate brokerage sector that has just been described is 
unlikely to arise without some help from sensible public policy.  The anti-competitive tendencies of 
the incumbent industry seem quite powerful and will need neutralization.  The following three 
recommendations should help. 
 First, entry by banks -- currently impeded by the absence of enabling legislation by Congress 
and/or regulatory approvals by the Federal Reserve40 -- should be unblocked.  Banks would be new 
players, from outside the existing culture of the residential real estate brokerage industry.  This 
"outsider" identity, by itself, would be extremely valuable for introducing aggressive competition 
into the industry.  Further, it is worth noting that banks, when entering securities brokerage, often 
found that discount brokerage was an appropriate strategy for their entry.  Since discount brokerage 
in real estate transactions is still relatively rare, having banks (with their brand name recognition) as 
purveyors of this form of service (if that is the route that they choose) would likely be an extra 
benefit. 
 The prospect of banks' entering any field outside of traditional banking almost always raises 
two sets of concerns.  One concern is bank regulators' fears that the new service might somehow 
undermine the safety and soundness of banks.  However, there are straightforward ways of dealing 
with these fears.41  If bank regulators understand the service and can set appropriate capital 
standards and competency standards (as they do for traditional bank services), then the service can 
be provided directly by the bank, and the traditional structure of bank safety-and-soundness 
regulation can be extended to this service as well (when, and only when it is provided by a bank42).  
    40 See Hahn, Litan, and Gurman (2005) for more details. 
    41 See Shull and White (1998) for an elaboration of these arguments. 
    42 This caveat is important.  The bank regulators' legitimate concerns about the safety and 
soundness of banks should not become the excuse for regulating residential real estate brokerage 
more broadly.  The analogy with lending is worthwhile.  Though bank regulators' concerns about 
safety and soundness are legitimate with respect to bank lending, they are not applicable (and do not 
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If the service is not appropriate for a bank itself, then it can be provided by a bank holding company 
or by a separately capitalized subsidiary of the bank (with appropriate scrutiny by bank regulators 
that any transactions between the bank and its holding company or subsidiary are on arm’s-length 
terms). 
 The other concern about bank provision of non-traditional services is that this expansion of 
banks' services will somehow enhance the banks' perceived economic power and/or the banks will 
act in a predatory manner so as to drive out their non-bank competitors and then raise prices above 
competitive levels.  This second concern, as well as the concern about safety and soundness, was 
raised in the discussions of banks' being permitted to enter the securities business.43  Those concerns 
proved unfounded in that area.  It seems likely that they would be unfounded with respect to 
residential real estate brokerage as well. 
 Second, the Antitrust Division should maintain a high level of scrutiny with respect to the 
use of MLSs as exclusionary devices and with respect to local groups of real estate agents excluding 
mavericks in the ways that have been described above.  The NASDAQ dealers case provides a good 
object lesson in the dangers of markets that have sell-side/buy-side interaction characteristics that 
make them conducive to freezing out mavericks and the necessity for high levels of scrutiny. 
 Third, the Division and the FTC should continue their efforts at vigorously lobbying (and 
even suing) the states so as to urge pro-competitive actions on the part of their licensing agencies. 
 Finally, any advocacy of public policy actions to encourage greater competition should 
acknowledge the possibility of a "law of unintended consequences".  In the case of securities 
 
apply) to lending by finance companies, factoring firms, or other entities (including individuals) that 
make loans.  These safety-and-soundness concerns are different from wider societal concerns about 
things like inappropriate discrimination by lenders, which does have wider regulatory applicability. 
    43 See, e.g., Goldberg and White (1979) and Walter (1985). 
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commissions, greater competition meant reduced profits for the industry from that line of business, 
which led to increased emphasis on investment banking and the eventual scandal of excessive 
promotion of securities under the guise of "research".  With respect to residential real estate 
commissions, one possible reaction of the industry to heightened competition could be a lobbying 
effort to convince the states to tighten licensing procedures severely so as to restrict entry into the 
industry. 
 Predicting such "unintended consequences" is, of course, exceedingly difficult.  But the main 
point remains:  Policymakers should be on their guard against such consequences. 
 
 V. Conclusion
 The residential real estate brokerage industry is an important one for the U.S. economy.  
Over 1% of the U.S. labor force has real estate licenses; in 2004 $61 billion in commissions were 
paid in connection with home sales. 
 More vigorous competition is clearly possible and desirable.  The experience of the 
securities industry three decades ago is instructive in this respect.  Self-serving arguments by the real 
estate brokerage industry against more vigorous competition ought to be disregarded, just as were 
similar arguments by the securities industry 35 years ago.  Public policy can and should play a role 
in pushing the real estate brokerage industry in a more competitive direction.  The results could only 
be favorable for house sellers and buyers alike. 
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